Abstract: This paper develops a model where firms make state-dependent decisions on both pricing and acquisition of information. It is shown that when information is not perfect, menu costs combined with the aggregate price level serving as an endogenous public signal generate rigidity in price setting even when there is no real rigidity. Specifically, firms reveal their information to other firms by changing their prices. Because the cost of changing prices is borne by a firm but the benefit from better information goes to other firms, firms have an incentive to postpone price changes until more information is revealed by other firms via the price level. The information externality and menu costs reinforce each other in delaying price adjustment. As a result, the response of inflation to nominal shocks is both sluggish and hump-shaped. The model can also qualitatively capture a number of stylized facts about price setting at the micro level and inflation at the macro level.
Introduction
One of the central questions in macroeconomics is how small frictions such as menu costs for adjusting prices can generate large and long-lasting real effects in response to nominal shocks. After the seminal contributions of Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985) , it became clear that small barriers to nominal price flexibility should be complemented with real rigidities (Ball and Romer 1990) to convert small costs of price adjustment at the micro level into significant, persistent fluctuations at the macro level. Real rigidity is usually modeled as an imperfection in factor or good markets. However, available models have difficulty matching some stylized facts about price setting at the macro and/or micro levels. This paper provides an alternative, information-based mechanism for the amplification and propagation of nominal shocks that captures qualitatively many stylized facts.
The key idea of the paper is that in economies with imperfect, dispersed information, macroeconomic variables not only clear markets but also aggregate information by aggregating private actions. GDP, price level, and the like inform economic agents about unobserved fundamentals such as technology, stance of monetary policy and so on. Adding a small cost to private actions in such economies can lead to large social multipliers and, more specifically, to significant rigidities in adjustment.
In particular, I demonstrate that the combination of (a) the aggregate price level serving as a free endogenous public signal and (b) menu costs generates rigidity in price setting in otherwise very flexible economies, i.e., economies without real rigidities (e.g., no monopolistic competition or any sort of interdependence in the demand functions).
To formalize these ideas, I present a model where firms make state-dependent decisions on pricing and acquisition of information. Specifically, firms face menu costs and infer the current state of nominal demand from a sequence of private and public signals. Firms can buy additional signals if they wish. The price level serves as a free endogenous public signal through which private information is aggregated and communicated to firms. In this economy, firms reveal their information to other firms by changing (or not changing) their prices. Because information is not perfect, every additional piece of information is valuable and, therefore, every firm has an incentive to observe other firms' actions that convey useful information about unobserved fundamentals. With a richer information set, a firm can obviously set a better price and earn larger profits.
Suppose there is a shock to nominal demand and firms receive imperfect signals about the shock.
Note that the cost of changing the price (the menu cost) and therefore revealing private information about the shock is borne privately by a firm, while the benefit from better information goes to other firms (since the public signal is free) because other firms can utilize the information set implied by the price change of the adjusting firm. Thus, the value of information is different for a firm and for the economy as a whole; there is an important information externality. Because no firm has an incentive to reveal its information to other firms, private information may get entrapped in private hands and, therefore, the price level may fail to aggregate private information completely.
Most importantly, because of this information externality, firms have an incentive to postpone price changes until more information about unobserved shocks to nominal demand is revealed by other firms via the price level. In other words, every firm wants to free ride on other firms. But if firms change their prices by a little or few firms change their prices, the aggregate price level changes by little which leads to further delaying of price changes at the firm level because a small change in the aggregate price level communicates that the probability or the size of the unobserved aggregate shock is small and hence price adjustment is not warranted. Thus, the information externality and menu costs reinforce each other in delaying price adjustment and the propagation of information in the economy. More precisely, because of this "wait-andsee" game played by firms, the response of inflation to nominal shocks is sluggish and hump-shaped. This matches the stylized facts about the behavior of inflation in response to nominal shocks (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005) and unconditional persistence of aggregate inflation (Fuhrer and Moore 1995, Stock and Watson 1999) .
The same reasoning applies to the endogenous acquisition of information. For example, when the economy is hit with a shock, few firms will buy information as they have an incentive to free ride on those firms which do buy costly information, which leads to a wait-and-see game in acquisition of information.
This game generates sluggish adjustment of information sets after the shock even when firms can be more cognizant of shocks. Furthermore, when the economy reaches a steady state, acquisition of information is very weak so that firms are satisfied with a minimum amount of information about the state of the economy.
One implication of this pattern of information acquisition is that the level of (in)attention to macroeconomic developments should fluctuate over the business cycle with attention rising temporarily and with a delay after large macroeconomic shocks (e.g., start of a recession) and then falling back to steady state levels which is consistent with the evidence presented in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) .
The model captures qualitatively a number of stylized facts about price setting at the micro level:
there is a lack of synchronization in price setting; 2) price changes at the micro level have little inertia; 3) a relatively large fraction of firms change prices in any given period; 4) the average absolute price change is large; 5) the hazard of price adjustment decreases with the duration of the price spell. The model is also consistent with stylized facts about information: 2 1) firms have imperfect information; 2) acquisition of information is costly; 3) firms often make pricing decisions without utilizing all potentially available information; 4) conditional responses of mean forecasts and mean forecast errors are serially correlated and move in the direction of changes in the forecasted fundamentals; 5) inattention temporarily decreases after large macroeconomic shocks.
The persistence of aggregate inflation in my model sharply contrasts with the previous literature on state-dependent pricing. Caplin and Spulber (1987) , Leahy (1991, 1997) , Danziger (1999) , Golosov and Lucas (2007) and others find that in economies with state-dependent pricing monetary policy shocks have little or no real effects because of (almost) instantaneous price adjustment. Dotsey et al. (1999) , Willis (2003) and Gertler and Leahy (2008) achieve significant persistence in models with state-dependent pricing only when they introduce considerable real rigidity in price determination at the firm level. Yet, in their models inflation still jumps immediately at the time of the nominal shock (which reflects the forwardlooking nature of pricing decisions) and inflation does not have a hump-shaped response. Instead, inflation declines monotonically, which is similar to the response in models with time-dependent pricing. In contrast, the present paper shows that aggregate price adjustment is gradual in response to nominal shocks even when there is no explicit strategic complementarity. Specifically, although the intensive margin (average price change) responds strongly at the time of the shock (this is typical for all Ss-type models), the extensive margin (fraction of firms changing prices) responds so weakly on impact that the jump in the intensive margin has almost no effect on the aggregate price level and inflation. In the end, the intensive margin leads the extensive margin but the selection effect typical of state-dependent pricing does not undo the sluggish response of the extensive margin.
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Previous studies of price setting under imperfect information (e.g., Lucas 1972 , Mankiw and Reis 2002 , Bonomo and Carvalho 2004 , Reis 2006 , Alvarez et al. 2010 ) typically assume flexible prices and timedependent updating of information. This paper contributes to this literature in three important directions.
First, firms always have access to some information about current events in the economy which contrasts with a common assumption in the previous works that firms do not know anything about current and recent shocks between planned, time-dependent information updates. Second, I endogenize the decision to acquire additional information and make it state-dependent rather than time-dependent as usually imposed or derived in the previous studies. Third, I introduce explicit menu costs and consider state-dependent pricing while previous work assumes flexible prices. Hence, the decisions to change prices and purchase information are contingent on macroeconomic and firm-specific conditions. I show that these extensions have important effects on the price-setting policy of firms and the dynamics of inflation. 4 Table 1 shows how this paper fits within the literature.
The present paper builds on insights developed in Caplin and Leahy (1994) and Chamley and Gale (1994) . In these papers, private information also gets entrapped and the endogenous public signal 3 Midrigan (2006) considers multi-product firms that have economies of scale in the technology of adjusting price. These economies generate real rigidity (strategic complementarity) internal to a firm (in contrast to previous literature where real rigidity is external to a firm, e.g., market demand externality) and thus nominal shocks can generate real effects larger than in standard models with menu costs. Dotsey and King (2005) achieve a small, cotemporaneous increase and hump shape in the inflation response to a nominal shock by introducing very strong real rigidity (smoothed kinked demand as in Kimball (1995) ). 4 In addition, my model captures the low serial correlation of price changes at the micro level while previous models with sticky information (or rational inattention) do not. In those models, there are no menu costs, and prices are changed every period. As long as economic fundamentals (e.g., money supply) are serially correlated, price changes at the firm level are also serially correlated. This issue is also relevant for models where firms have a convex cost of adjusting prices (e.g., Rotemberg 1982), use indexation, or set a price path (e.g., Burstein 2006) . significantly affects the irreversible decision to enter into an industry or invest in a country. In addition to focusing on price setting rather than entry decisions, my model is different from these seminal papers and the work that followed in several key respects. First, I consider an infinite horizon setup rather than a one time game. Second, information flows in my model are determined endogenously and spread over time rather than imposed in the beginning of the game. Third, actions (e.g., price change) are reversible and continuous rather than irreversible and discreet. 5 These departures allow me to assess whether my model can qualitatively (and potentially quantitatively) match stylized facts about price setting, acquisition of information, and behavior of macroeconomic aggregates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I lay out the model: specify the process for nominal demand; present the firm's problem for setting prices and updating information; describe the dynamic program of the firm; and explain how to solve it when there is imperfect information. I then define the equilibrium and show how to solve the model. I also discuss briefly the interrelationship between the information externality, menu costs, and endogenous public signals. In section 3, I solve the model numerically and discuss a firm's optimal policy, a firm's optimal reset price, and the equilibrium distribution of the price level. I use numerical simulations to illustrate the importance of various parts of the model. 
Model
In this section, I present a theoretical model to formalize the intuition behind the interplay between menu costs, free endogenous public signals and sluggish price adjustment in an economy with imperfect information. In this economy, firms maximize profits as well as decide how much information they need to purchase given private and public signals about the unobserved, exogenously evolving state of nominal demand. This is a complex problem because firms have to filter endogenous public signals about nominal demand and optimize both prices and acquisition of information simultaneously. I impose sufficient structure to convert this setup into an equivalent dynamic programming problem with observed state variables which can be solved recursively. Specifically, firms will use a simple recursive Bayes rule to filter signals about nominal demand and then use the posterior probabilities as state variables in the optimization problem.
Conveniently, filtering and optimization problems are separated so that one can use standard dynamic programming tools to solve for and analyze firm's optimal policies.
5 See Chamley (2004) and Vives (2008) for overviews of this literature.
Monetary policy
Monetary policy has two regimes: high (H) and low (L). Each regime is characterized by the level of nominal demand y t (equivalently, money stock): y H and y L . The probability of staying in the same regime next period is exogenous and equal to . Hence, the transition matrix is
This transition matrix (and, hence, the distribution of states) is common knowledge. The symmetry of the transition matrix and a small number of states keep computation manageable. The setup can be easily generalized to multi-state settings. Nominal demand is the only aggregate shock in this economy.
Firms
There is a unit measure of firms indexed by 0,1 . The profit function in regime , is /2 where is the exogenously given optimal price in regime . The high-level assumption of a quadratic profit function reflects the fact that deviations of profit from its maximum value are of second order if a given price is close to optimal and, hence, profits described by flexible demand and cost structures can be reasonably well approximated by a quadratic function in price (Mankiw 1985, Akerlof and Yellen 1985) . This second-order approximation of the firm's payoff is consistent with an economy where firms produce goods in segmented markets with a downward sloping demand curve in each market. Since markets are segmented, there is no explicit strategic complementarity in price setting and, therefore, the optimal price does not depend on actions of other firms. Firms choose the prices to maximize the profits given the information they have about the state of nominal demand y t . Whenever firms change prices, they pay a fixed menu cost τ. Alternatively, one can define shocks to the profit function so that firms observe fluctuations in profits instead of direct signals x it about y t . The latter, however, is more convenient in analyzing the problem. In the present setup, firms do not observe profits directly and maximize profits in expectation. 7 Making the decision to change the price depend on the past price level signal rather than the current price level helps to ensure that an equilibrium exists. This is because it avoids circularity between today's price decisions aggregating in today's price level, which is the signal on which those price decisions would be based. See Jackson (1991) for a discussion of this standard assumption. 
8 In the present setup firms are assumed to observe only prices. Obviously, one can easily extend the present setup by allowing firms to observe quantities as well as by adding more sources of uncertainty (which includes noise to public signals) to preserve imperfect information. This richer specification would improve the plausibility of the model but it would also obscure the intuition, and make the solution more complex without changing the main qualitative results of the paper. Hence, I use the simple specification with the minimal number of observed variables and shocks. 9 I interpret private signals x it and z it as a firm's own market research not revealed to other firms. In contrast, Veldkamp (2006a) considers economies in which there exist industries supplying the same information to heterogeneous firms. This alternative setup can induce more coordination in pricing decisions across firms which can lead to multiple equilibria. Likewise, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) , , 
Note that (2) is an intertemporal filter, while (3) is an intratemporal filter. 
Dynamic program
The value function in (4) is in a generic form and it is now convenient to write the specific dynamic program that a typical firm solves. To facilitate presentation, I show the flow of information, actions, and states in Figure 1 . The payoff from not changing the price and not buying the signal z it is equal to , ,
where the law of motion for I it is given by (1). The value of changing the price without purchasing the signal 
After combining these three options, a firm's value function is , , max
The solution to the dynamic program (8) gives the optimal response given a firm's state variables and , . Denote the optimal policy with Π. Note that, because there is no strategic interaction, no firm has incentives to deviate from Π. One can conjecture that, because of fixed costs, the optimal policy is of Ss type.
However, regions of actions are functions of both state variables (i.e., price and posterior) and generally cannot be reduced to simple one-dimensional triggers.
Given the optimal policy Π, define the law of motion for the price and belief at the firm level as
, , , , , , ; , , ,
where the vector , , , , , , , , , collects the structural parameters. The laws of motion (9) and (10) depend on , because pricing and information acquisition decisions depend on how firms interpret which in turn depends on , . Although , are exogenous to a firm, , are not a part of because they are determined in equilibrium. Nominal demand y t enters (9) and (10) through the private signals x and z, and the public signal .
2.5
Aggregate dynamics and equilibrium To close the model (see Figure 1) , observe that the law of motion for the price level can be computed by aggregating the firm-level law of motion (9) 
Likewise by appropriate aggregation of (9) and (10), define : as the law of motion for , , the joint density of the cross-sectional distribution of information sets and prices at time t. Like (11), depends on the policy Π chosen by firms.
Given these laws of motion and the Markov chain for y t , one can generate the time series of the price level , , … and construct conditional distributions for the price level , . Clearly, , depend on , because the aggregate laws of motion depend on the policy Π chosen by firms which in turn depends on , . For brevity, let Υ be the mapping (updating operator) from , to , . In equilibrium, the generated , is equal to , ; that is, firms' beliefs about , must be consistent with reality as firms perceive it. Hence, equilibrium conditional distributions of the price level (1981) and others document, economic agents disagree not only about future macroeconomic conditions but also about past and current macroeconomic conditions which is not possible if public signals are fully revealing. To prevent the public signal from being perfectly revealing, one could add noise to the public signal (e.g., Singleton 1987, Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009 ) and/or assume that agents fit misspecified (typically linear ARMA) models to forecast the dynamics of the public signal (e.g., Sargent 1991 , Lorenzoni 2009 ). 16 With these modifications, the properties of the equilibrium change smoothly as one adds conditioning variables but the intuition becomes clouded and computation gets practically unmanageable.
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On the other hand, if agents have heterogeneous information sets (because public signals are not fully revealing), it is difficult to construct a tractable state space for an agent's problem because the state space should include current and future higher order expectations, that is, expectations of other agents (see e.g. Woodford 2003) . In general, this requires an infinite state space (so called "infinite regress"). Previous work circumvents this problem by introducing different simplifying assumptions that typically impose short lived information (e.g., Lucas, 1972 , Dotsey and King 1986 , Singleton 1987 or fit an appropriately defined Kalman filter with a truncated state space (e.g., Townsend 1983 , Sargent 1991 . The first option leads to information being fully revealed immediately or shortly after shocks occur. The second option requires, in general, a large state space which makes a firm's dynamic program computationally unmanageable.
Since I want to have the simplest possible setup to clearly illustrate the main points of the paper, I
cut the Gordian knot by assuming the following: in firms' view, it is only the current state of nominal demand that determines the current price level and the prior paths of the price level or nominal demand are irrelevant for the current price level. 18 This simplifying assumption entails that the conditional distribution of the price level in regime , is given by
which makes the signal extraction problem recursive. 19 An important question is whether results derived later in the paper stem from the assumed conditional independence of public signals. Indeed, it is not optimal for firms to make this assumption since Pr Pr | , , and, hence, one should interpret firms' behavior as boundedly rational. However, there are several reasons to believe that, when agents are fully rational, this assumption may be a sensible description for optimal behavior and that results presented in the next section continue to hold.
First, this assumption is a reasonable approximation to optimal behavior if firms are informationally constrained as in Woodford (2009) or there is a cost of recomputing the posterior using the entire history every period (and it is less costly to recompute the posterior recursively). Second, although the cost of using suboptimal rules varies with parameters of the model (e.g., the average duration of the regime), the lost profit can be as low as 8% of given baseline parameter values, which is a relatively small amount. Third and most importantly, if it is costly to use more sophisticated forecasting/interpretation rules which involve a larger conditioning set of variables, the decision to use these sophisticated rules is similar to the decision to buy additional information. Then, as discussed below, few firms will use these costly rules at the time of the nominal shocks because every firm will want to free ride on other firms that pay the cost of using these more expensive and more precise forecasting/interpretation rules. Because of this wait-and-see game, firms will rationally choose to stay ignorant about shocks and, hence, the delayed response of inflation survives if firms can choose to use superior but costly forecasting rules. Fourth, as shown in Section 3, the persistence and hump shape of the inflation response to nominal shocks is not an artifact of bounded rationality. When I set the menu cost to zero to eliminate the incentives to postpone price adjustment, the response of inflation to nominal shocks does not exhibit strong persistence or the hump shape.
Finally, I present and solve a simple three period model with fully rational agents in Appendix 2 and
show that the wait-and-see game survives and generates sluggish hump-shaped inflation response to nominal
shocks. An important lesson from this exercise is that although I consider an economy where public signals are not fully revealing because firms fit misspecified models to interpret public signals, the intuition behind the wait-and-see incentive extends to economies with perfectly rational firms and fully revealing public signals. Even if firms are perfectly rational, they have an incentive to free ride on other firms and postpone price adjustment. To emphasize, this incentive works even when there is no built-in real rigidity of any kind.
It is the possibility to observe actions of other firms that creates a stimulus to wait which changes the qualitative shape of the aggregate inflation response.
The assumption in (12) has several critical benefits. First, the assumption prevents the public signal from being fully revealing because firms use a misspecified model to interpret public signals. Second, the assumption simplifies computation enormously by minimizing the state space in the firm's dynamic program and delivering a simple recursive evolution of (proof is in Appendix 1). Specifically, given this assumption and the rest of the setup, Striebel (1965 Striebel ( , 1975 and Bertsekas and Shreve (1996) show that the posterior probability is a statistic sufficient for control (that is, encapsulates all information necessary for decision making) and the value function is stationary. 20 Since the state space for y t consists of two points in my application, the posterior probability is a scalar and represents a genuine compression of information contained in a large vector I it . It follows from Striebel (1965 Striebel ( , 1975 and Bertsekas and Shreve (1996) that one can use standard tools of dynamic programming to solve for value function with two state variables p it and so that the counterparts of equations (5)- (8) are respectively , ,
, , max , , ,
where , with h given by (3) and the intertemporal law of motion for posterior , ,
and finally a firm's value function is , , max
One can also readily verify that, by assumptions of the problem, the model is symmetric around , :
, i.e., , 1 , for any and p.
Solution
The difficulty of solving the model lies in the fact that how firms interpret public signals depends on what firms do and, at the same time, the actions of firms depend on how the public signal behaves. Hence, the distribution of the aggregate price level conditional on y t ( and ) must be determined simultaneously with the optimal pricing and information policies at the firm level. To address this problem, I use simulations to generate and approximate the density functions and . To compute the equilibrium, I perform the following steps:
1) Guess density functions , .
2) Given , , solve the dynamic program for the firm.
3) Given solution in step 2, simulate the model for a large number of periods and firms.
4) Compute the generated distribution of the price level (given money regime) , .
5) Update the distribution 1 and 1
, where ω is a constant between 0 and 1.
6) Repeat steps 2-5 until convergence (i.e., ) is reached.
The procedure can be further simplified by observing that 1 . This follows from the symmetry of the problem and, hence, it is enough to consider . To approximate the conditional probability density function , I discretize the interval , into N b bins. 21 Then, I update the distribution as , , 1 , where k denotes the bin. To solve the firm level dynamic program I use approximation methods. Specifically, I use Gaussian quadratures to compute expectations, approximate the value function with polynomials in price p and posterior μ, and solve the dynamic program using collocation methods (see Miranda and Fackler (2002) for a description of these methods). I set ω = 0.98 to ensure smooth evolution of the conditional density . I simulate the conditional density with 5,000 firms, 5,000 periods and N b = 100 bins. To reduce the simulation noise in , I use optimal kernel smoothing to evaluate the density at a given point (bin). The starting distribution for is the uniform distribution.
Results
In this section, I parameterize and solve the model, present the equilibrium distribution of the price level, and describe the optimal policy for pricing and acquisition of information. The main objective of my numerical simulations is to demonstrate the workings of the model. I vary informational assumptions to show the importance of the interplay between menu costs and the aggregate price level serving as an endogenous public signal. Comparative statistics demonstrate the effect of alternative parameter values on equilibrium outcomes. I also argue that the model can qualitatively match the stylized facts about price setting at the macro and micro levels.
21 Since firm-level prices are bounded between and , the aggregate price level has the same bounds.
Parameterization
The following parameters must be assigned values: 1) the menu cost τ; 2) the cost of additional information ξ; 3) persistence of nominal demand λ; 4) discount factor β; 5)
, optimal prices in each regime; 6) distribution of ε and (noise in signals x and z); 7) nominal demands y H and y L . Given the abstract nature of the model, the choice of parameter values should be taken as a crude approximation aimed at showing the properties of the model.
I assume that a quarter is the duration of the period and set the discount factor to 0.99, which corresponds to a 4% annual interest rate. 22 I normalize 1, 0, and 1. Zbaracki et al. (2004) report that the physical (menu) cost of changing price is 0.71% of the annual net profit margin. Figure 2 presents the regions of actions as a function of the two state variables: price and posterior. A firm's price inherited from the previous period is on the horizontal axis. A firm's posterior for being in the high regime is on the vertical axis. The band around the diagonal is the region where it is optimal to keep the price unchanged and to avoid buying additional information. This band of inaction reflects the fact that, if the price is close to optimal given the posterior, it is not worth changing it. It is 22 If the time period shrink to zero (i.e., time becomes continuous), there is no "wait and see" game because there is no "another period" in continuous time (see Chamley (2004) for details). If one reduces the duration of the time period (e.g., seconds instead of quarters) and does not reduce the precision of the signal, then adjustment is going to be completed faster in terms of absolute time (e.g., it takes seconds not quarters). If one reduces the informativeness of signals per unit of time, then adjustment does not change very much. That is, if the amount of information contained in per-second signals accumulated over one quarter is equal to the amount of information contained in one per-quarter signal, then aggregate dynamics is unlikely to change. optimal to change the price without buying new information if the price is far from the optimal, and there is little uncertainty about the current state (i.e., the posterior is close to one or zero). Finally, it is generally optimal to buy additional information if the posterior is close to ½, a situation with the greatest uncertainty about the current state. Note that it is not optimal to change price or purchase additional information when price is close to ½ and posterior is close to ½. At this point, the price is close to optimal given the posterior and by waiting one or more periods (until there is more certainty), a firm can save the cost of changing price or buying information. Figure 2 plots the optimal reset price as a function of the posterior estimate of the current state of the money regime. The broken line is the frictionless optimal reset price # .
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By the choice of parameter values,
# is equal to and, hence, the slope of the line is one (45 line). The optimal price is equal to ½ when the posterior is equal to ½. If the posterior is greater than ½ but not close to one, the optimal reset price exceeds the optimal frictionless reset price. On the one hand, the posterior next period is expected to move towards ½ and, hence, there is a stimulus to set prices below # . On the other hand, there is a greater chance that the regime is high and thus it may stay high for a while. By setting a higher price, a firm can then economize on menu and information costs because with a higher price the probability of price and/or information update is smaller. The second motive dominates the first and hence the optimal reset price is above
If the posterior is close to one, the first motive outweighs the second and thus the optimal reset price is below # . The argument for less than ½ is symmetric.
Panel C in Figure 2 presents the equilibrium distribution of the price level conditional on the regime being high. Clearly, the mass of the distribution is shifted to the right because the price level is more likely to be high when y t is high. However, there is a non-trivial density on values between 0.1 and 0.2. The low density for the intermediate values of the price level reflects the fact that the price level spends little time between the two "steady" states, which are defined as states with an absolute change in the price level less than 0.001. Because the distribution of the price level is not degenerate, observing the price level does not eliminate uncertainty.
Panels A and B in Figure 3 show typical sample paths of the price level and inflation, respectively.
The paths clearly indicate the state-dependent nature of the price level and inflation responses to changes in nominal demand. Consider the change in y t at t = 138 when the price level has converged to its stable lowdemand value. Immediately after the change, the response is weak and in the first periods after the change the price level increases sluggishly. After some point, however, the price level starts to rise at an increasing rate. Then the change in the price level slows down. Hence, inflation has a hump-shaped response. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the cross-sectional price and posterior distributions. Note that the price distribution reallocates the mass of the firms to the right at a rate slower than the posterior distribution does because price changes are slowed down by the menu cost, while posterior changes are not. The gradual reallocation of the posteriors implies that mean forecasts and forecast errors move in the direction of the change in y t , which is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008 does not change its price, it does not reveal its information (or more precisely, it is interpreted by other firms that the firm's belief about y t has not changed enough to justify a price change). Because firms do not interact strategically, no firm has an incentive to reveal its information that could be valuable to other firms, which is similar in spirit to Stiglitz (1976, 1980) . Indeed, the cost of revealing information (manifested by price change) is borne by a firm, while the benefit from better information goes to other firms (recall that the public signal is free). Consequently, there is an information externality and private information may get entrapped. Furthermore and most importantly, the information externality creates an incentive for firms to postpone their price adjustment until more information is revealed by other firms via . In equilibrium, firms may have weak incentives to change prices because other firms do not change their prices.
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At the time of the shock, firms are quite confident that they are in the low regime (recall that a prior close to zero implies high precision of the prior). Hence the value of additional information is low and buying signal z is not likely to be optimal. Furthermore, the endogenous price level refers to the previous period. Hence, in the first periods, few firms find it optimal to change price. By waiting until more information is revealed by other firms via , a firm can save menu and/or information costs. Since few firms change price, the price level changes relatively little and, therefore, signal continues to indicate that nominal demand is likely to be low. 25 This is where the information externality slows down the response. In subsequent periods, as more and more firms change their prices, the price level rises and induces an increasing number of firms to change their prices (see Panels C and D in Figure 3 ). When the posterior approaches ½ and estimate of the current state becomes more uncertain, firms choose to purchase additional information and, thus, inflation accelerates further (see Panel C, Figure 3) . As the price level approaches one, the incentive to change prices at the firm level falls because the state is now more certain. Thus, inflation 23 The model also generates forecast disagreement across firms because firms receive idiosyncratic signals thus qualitatively matching evidence presented in Mankiw et al. (2004) . However, because of the binary change in the unobserved state y t , forecast disagreement increases after a change in y t which is inconsistent with evidence presented in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) . 24 Ball and Cecchetti (1988) use similar logic to explain endogenous staggering of pricing decisions. In contrast to this paper, Ball and Cecchetti treat the frequency of price adjustment as exogenous. 25 If firms are not subject to the simplifying assumption made in section 2.6, an arbitrarily small increase in the price level at this stage is fully revealing the change in y t . This sharp result stems from the fact that, without noise in the endogenous public signal, idiosyncratic noise in private signals washes out at the aggregate level and thus any change in the aggregate action reveals the state of y t .
slows down. In summary, inflation has a hump-shaped response with a weak reaction at the time of the change in y t .
Other episodes show that the response of inflation can be much faster and sharper. Consider, for example, regime changes between t = 80 and t = 100. At the time of the regime change, many firms continue to believe in the high demand. Consequently, when real-time signals z and x indicate a shift in policy, many firms embrace this signal and quickly move prices back to the high-demand steady state. This explains why the response of inflation is so quick and large.
Inflation in this model has two active margins: intensive (average price change) and extensive (fraction of firms that change price). Panel D in Figure 3 plots the paths of these two. After the shock, the intensive margin reacts strongly. In contrast, the extensive margin has a significant sluggishness. This important difference in the behavior of price adjustment margins reflects the state-dependent nature of the problem, i.e., the fact that adjusting firms are further away from the optimal reset price than non-adjusting firms. Both margins are strongly correlated with inflation (Table 2) . However, Table 3 shows that the extensive margin leads both inflation and the intensive margin while the intensive margin is coincident with inflation. Although inflation is persistent with a serial correlation of 0.919, there is a minute negative serial correlation of price changes at the firm level (-0.010) because of the Ss nature of the price setting: firms reset prices by large amounts and keep prices fixed until another large adjustment is needed. This result is consistent with the stylized fact that at the micro level price changes are not persistent.
Even when the level of inflation converges to zero, approximately 0.5% of firms continue to adjust prices. This churning is determined by the fact that firms receive noisy signals about y t , and occasionally the signal moves the posterior enough to induce some firms to change price. In the aggregate, however, these individual price movements cancel out. One can have a greater fraction of firms changing price if the menu cost τ is smaller. On average, 5.3% of firms change price in a given period with 2.5% changing price without buying endogenous signal z and 2.8% after buying z. The fraction is small relative to the monthly 10-20% fraction reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) The dynamics of endogenous updates of information in many respects parallels the dynamics of price adjustment and several points are worth highlighting. First, the frequency of endogenous updates increases only gradually after a shock to y t because each firm wants to free ride and learn about the regime change from other firms via and thus avoid paying the cost of purchasing additional information. Over time, as evidence about the change in y t accumulates and firms become less certain about the current regime, firms choose to acquire more information about y t . As the state of y t gets learned, firms switch back to being satisfied with minimal information about y t . Indeed, the average fraction of firms buying information in the steady states is only 0.2%. Second, the unwillingness of firms to purchase additional information right after the shock demonstrates that using cheaper but possibly suboptimal rules to interpret public signals may be fully rational from a firm's perspective. This optimizing decision to stay relatively ignorant about developments in the macroeconomy can justify the simplifying assumption in section 2.6 since introducing an explicit possibility of using a more sophisticated, but costlier rule to update beliefs will not change the wait-and-see game and therefore the qualitative dynamics in the model. Third, the fraction of firms buying information is smaller than the fraction of firms changing prices. This pattern matches the stylized fact that firms change information less frequently than they do prices (Fabiani et al. 2005) . Finally, the dynamics of endogenous information updates in response to an aggregate shock in my model is consistent with the behavior of inattention over the business cycle when inattention gradually falls for 6-10 quarters after the start of a recession and then returns to pre-recession levels (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2010) . Previous models with imperfect information cannot reproduce this important fact because in these models the decisions about what information to track and when to update information are based on the "average" behavior of the economy and thus these decisions are not tied to any particular realization of shocks in the economy. In contrast, my model with endogenous acquisition of information naturally generates this humpshaped and delayed response of (in)attention to aggregate shocks.
Alternative information and pricing assumptions
To better understand the contribution of different elements of the model, I present the effects of different information and pricing assumptions on the response of the price level and inflation to changes in nominal demand. Specifically, I contrast the benchmark model with the following alternatives: 1) the menu cost  is zero; 2) the price level is not observed; 3) there is no signal z; 4) there is no signal z and the price level is not observed; 5) time-dependent price setting; 6) firms are hit with idiosyncratic shocks to menu costs. These cases are also interesting because they represent models previously used in the literature. Figure 5 presents the path of inflation for the benchmark and alternative models in response to nominal demand switching from low to high when the economy is in the low-demand steady state.
If there is no menu cost, there is no information externality and no incentive to postpone price adjustment. 26 Consequently, all firms change prices and reveal their private information. The price level aggregates information and transmits a strong public signal to firms about a change in nominal demand. This public signal coordinates actions of firms and stimulates further price adjustments. For this reason, inflation does not have significant inertia. Relative to the benchmark case, the half-life of the price level adjustment decreases to only 4 periods and the persistence of inflation is much smaller (Table 4 ). To emphasize, the scenario with zero menu costs shows that the delayed response of inflation is not an artifact of bounded rationality of firms but a genuine result stemming from the wait-and-see game discussed above.
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When the price level is not observed, firms' price setting is governed by private signals only and there is no coordination of firms' actions by the price level, an endogenous public signal. At the time of a regime change, a firm receives a private signal about the change. There is no incentive to wait until more information is revealed by other firms because the price level is not observed by firms. Consequently, inflation jumps on impact and peaks shortly after the change. The amplitude of the inflation response is much larger than in the benchmark case. Autocorrelations and cross-correlations decay faster than in the benchmark case (Table 5) . Furthermore, the intensive margin now does not lead inflation and the extensive margin. The half-life of the price level adjustment falls to 3 periods and serial correlation of inflation falls from 0.919 to 0.802 (Table 4 ). The observation that eliminating of an additional signal (the price level)
accelerates prices adjustment may seem striking as the reduction in the number of signals might be expected to slow down learning about the state of y t . However, this result highlights the central point of the paper. If the price level signal is available to firms, there is a strong incentive to postpone price adjustment until more information is revealed by other firms and then delayed adjustment at the micro level is propagated through general equilibrium effects described in the previous section to the macro level. In turn, slow adjustment at the macro level delays adjustment at the micro level and thus further delays subsequent adjustment at the macro level. These general equilibrium effects are so strong that the speed of price adjustment falls when firms can observe the price level. If the price level signal is not available to firms, firms cannot learn from other firms, there is no general equilibrium feedback between micro and macro levels of price adjustment and, thus, price adjustment is completed quickly. 26 Even if the menu cost is zero, the price level is not fully revealing in my model and, thus, firms continue to use both current and past signals about the state of nominal demand. By using past signals, firms improve the precision of the posterior and thus it is never optimal to use only current signals. 27 Note that in my parameterization it is never optimal to buy information because the price is always set to the optimal given the posterior and the gains from additional information are not large enough to compensate for the cost of additional information. Because signal x is noisy, firms reset their prices every period (with probability 1) and, hence, the extensive margin does not vary with changes in the money regime. Here, inflation and the average price change are equivalent.
Interestingly, Woodford (2003) One can also see now how the information externality is related to real rigidity. As described by Ball and Romer (1990, p. 184) , "Rigidity of prices after a nominal shock is a Nash equilibrium if the gain to a firm from changing its nominal price, given that other nominal prices are unchanged, is less than the cost of changing price. … [R]eal rigidity reduces the gain from adjustment [and] increases the range of nominal shocks for which nonadjustment is an equilibrium." Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) show that a market demand externality is the source of real rigidity in the standard models with monopolistic competition in goods markets. A firm does not want to reset its price when other firms keep their prices fixed because the firm can lose its market. In contrast, price rigidity in my model arises endogenously as an equilibrium outcome due to the information externality. A firm observes other firms' fixed prices and concludes that there is a consensus view that the aggregate shock is small or not likely and therefore there is no need to change the price. But if the price is not changed, then this consensus belief becomes self-enforcing since each firm does the same exercise.
In the case when signal z is not available, the amplitude of the inflation response is greatly attenuated. Furthermore, inflation peaks much later than in the benchmark case and the decay after the peak 28 The focus of this paper is on a menu cost economy, but a similar intuition applies to models with time-dependent pricing and firms filtering an endogenous public signal because non-adjusting firms do not change their prices and, hence, do not reveal their private information. In those models, however, private information gets entrapped by the virtue of the time-dependent pricing rather than endogenously. Exogenously determined price change slows down learning about nominal shocks but time-dependent pricing cannot generate an equilibrium in which price adjustment is slow due to a firm's decision to wait until more information is revealed by price adjustment of other firms. Therefore, signal extraction can make adjustment of prices slower but inflation necessarily jumps at the time of the nominal shock.
is slow because there is a thick tail of firms that have not learned about the change and have not changed price. In contrast, in the baseline specification, inflation accelerates rapidly and the tail disappears quickly because the price level transmits more information about y t from firms that bought additional signals. For this reason, the half-life of the price level adjustment increases from 12 periods in the benchmark model to 18
periods in the alternative model with no endogenously acquired signal. In addition, persistence of inflation increases (Table 4 ). The qualitative pattern of leads and lags in inflation and adjustment margins is similar to the benchmark case (Table 5) . However, the autocorrelations and cross-correlations are larger at longer horizons, reflecting the thick tail of firms that learn slowly about the change. 29 In short, although the endogenous acquisition of information affects the speed of price adjustment, it does not change the qualitative results.
In the case when neither z nor is observed, inflation jumps at the time of the regime change and peaks early but the decay in inflation is slow. An early peak is determined by the lack of coordination; that is, there is no transmission of information via the price level across firms. A slow decay reflects that firms cannot buy information or learn it from other firms to alleviate uncertainty and, thus, there is a thick tail of firms that have received signals more likely to be observed in the low regime. In the end, however, the persistence of inflation falls to 0.862 (Table 4) , the half-life of the price level adjustment decreases to 5 periods, and the intensive margin does not lead inflation and the extensive margin (Table 5) . Now consider a model with a Calvo-type price setting and perfect information. In this model, each firm has a 25% probability of having an opportunity to reset its price (Calvo parameter and , are optimal reset prices in high and low regimes. Therefore, the only reason why the price level does not adjust instantaneously is that only a fraction of firms is allowed to change prices. Indeed, inflation jumps at the time of the regime change and then gradually falls to zero at the Calvo rate. The half-life of price adjustment in the Calvo-type model is only 3 periods and serial correlation of inflation is only 0.658. This lack of inertia sharply contrasts with the slow-moving response in my model. Bils and Klenow (2004) and others report the firms appear to be hit with large idiosyncratic shocks that lead to frequent price adjustments. In my model, firms receive private informational shocks which can push firms into price adjustment even when aggregate factors do not change. However, one might be interested in the effects of non-informational shocks (e.g., productivity) inducing price adjustments. Since my model does not have an explicit production function, markup or the like, I follow Dotsey et al. (1999) and model these firm-specific innovations as shocks to the menu cost. To simplify computation, I set that in each period there is a 25 percent chance for any given firm to get a shock that enables this firm to reset its price for free. Thus, at least 25 percent of firms reset prices every period, which roughly matches magnitudes reported in micro level studies (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson 2008) .
One might have expected that idiosyncratic shocks are likely to make nominal shocks neutral in the sense that aggregate price level adjustment is completed faster than in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks because a fraction of firms is not "waiting" for other firms to adjust prices. Indeed, the impulse response of inflation with idiosyncratic shocks has a jump on impact and inflation accelerates faster than in the benchmark case. Yet, the qualitative shape of the inflation response is similar to the response in the benchmark case. There are several factors that slow down the response of inflation. First and most importantly, although idiosyncratic shocks make the price level more informative and hence accelerates learning and price adjustment, a more informative price level carries a greater weight in filtering and therefore reaction to private information is smaller which slows down learning and price adjustment. 31 This important equilibrium effect induces firms to adjust prices by small amounts at the time of a nominal shock and hence inflation jumps only by a small amount. Because the price level is not fully revealing, small changes in the price level lead to small price adjustments at the micro level and consequently gradual price adjustment at the macro level. However, a more informative price level makes learning quicker and, hence, inflation accelerates faster than in the benchmark case. Second, optimal reset price is concave (convex) in the posterior when the posterior is close to unity (zero). Hence, price changes are smaller than changes in the posterior when firms are relatively certain about the current state of y t . Furthermore, by Jensen's inequality, the change in the aggregate price level is smaller than the change in the average posterior. Thus, even when firms are free to reset prices, the price level changes only by small increments at the time of a nominal shock.
Note that although idiosyncratic shocks significantly affect the fraction of firms adjusting prices, they only marginally affect the persistence of inflation relative to the benchmark case. At the same time, intensive and extensive margins are more strongly correlated with inflation than in the benchmark case (Table 4) . In this case, neither intensive nor extensive margins lead inflation. Although the half-life falls from 12 periods to 9 periods, the change is not dramatic given that 25% of firms are free to reset prices every period.
In summary, the benchmark model strikes a balance between inertia and the timing of the response.
The availability of additional costly information does not change the qualitative response of inflation per se (i.e., hump shape), but it does change the persistence of inflation. Importantly, it is the combination of menu costs and the endogenous price level signal that delivers the main results. To reiterate, menu costs trap private information so that the price level does not aggregate information completely. Furthermore, the price level informs firms about y t and creates incentives to wait (not change price) until more information is revealed by other firms via the price level. But if individual prices change by a little, the price level changes by a little and induces firms to postpone price changes. Thus, the information externality and menu costs 31 See Amador and Weill (2007) for a more formal derivation of this result in a model where agents filter private and endogenous public signals and the weight on the public signal is determined in equilibrium.
reinforce each other and make price adjustment sluggish. If the menu cost is zero or the price level is not observed, inflation becomes much less inertial because there is no incentive to delay price change (no information externality). Specifically, inflation peaks immediately or shortly after the change in nominal demand and then it quickly decays to zero. It is also clear that large idiosyncratic shocks do not necessarily destroy the delayed response of inflation.
Comparative statics
In this section, I consider how changes in the precision of signals x ( ) and z ( ), the menu cost , cost of an additional endogenously acquired signal , and persistence of nominal demand  influence the policy function, optimal reset price, equilibrium conditional distribution of the price level and several statistics describing price setting.
Increasing the persistence of y t from 0.95 to 0.96 raises the average duration of regimes from 20 quarters to 25 quarters. This greater duration makes the option of updating information more valuable and, hence, optimal on a greater number of occasions (see Panel B in Figure 6 ). Greater persistence of y t implies that a set price is likely to be in place for a longer time. Hence, when firms set their prices, the effective horizon increases and the cost of buying additional information can be spread over a greater number of periods. Hence, the acquisition of costly information becomes more attractive. 32 Conversely, if is small, it may be optimal to never buy information because that information quickly becomes obsolete in a fastchanging environment.
The increase in the persistence affects the equilibrium conditional distribution of the price level (Panel A, Figure 7 ). The mass is reallocated towards the endpoints of the admissible price range. The distribution becomes more concentrated and spiked than in the benchmark distribution. The reason is that firms buy additional information in a greater number of situations and, hence, have a more precise estimate of the current state of y t . This better information at the firm level is further reinforced with the equilibrium effect that the price level becomes more informative; that is, the distribution of the price level has a much greater mass at the end points of the price range.
Finally, the optimal reset price, now crosses the 45 line only once at ½ due to the fact that the price level is now more informative. This makes firms more certain about nominal demand y t and, hence, the motive to set a lower price to catch the possibility of being in another regime is weak.
Now consider the case with a more precise signal z. Specifically, I reduce the standard deviation of the noise in the signal z from 0.25 to 0.225. A more informative signal z makes buying information more attractive. The consequences are similar to raising the persistence of y t . The region of buying information increases (Panel C, Figure 6 ). The average fraction of firms buying information increases to 4.7% (Table 6 ).
The equilibrium distribution of the price level conditional on the regime has greater spikes (Panel B, Figure   7 ) because firms buy information more frequently and, hence, the price level becomes more informative.
Inflation becomes less inertial. The optimal reset price crosses the 45 line only once and has a distinct sshape.
Reducing the cost of signal z leads to similar results. Firms choose to buy information more frequently (Panel F, Figure 6 ). This makes the price distribution spikier (Panel E, Figure 7 ), inflation less inertial and optimal reset price always above the 45 line for ½ and always below the 45 line for ½ (Panel E, Figure 8 ).
When I increase the standard deviation of the noise in the signal x from 0.7 to 0.8, the option of buying information becomes somewhat more attractive but the spikes in the equilibrium distribution of the price level are now shifted towards the center (Panel C, Figure 7) . Furthermore, the optimal reset price crosses the 45 line three times as in the benchmark case but in contrast to the benchmark case the optimal reset price bends more toward the center when the posterior is close to zero or one (Panel C, Figure 8 ). There are two opposing effects in this case. On the one hand, a greater "buy information" region leads to the effects described above. On the other hand, a less precise signal x works in the other direction, that is, makes the price level less informative. In equilibrium the second effect dominates the first. Because the price level is less informative, inflation becomes more persistent (Table 6 ).
Increasing the menu cost  from 0.035 to 0.045 makes the option of updating prices without buying information less favorable (Panel E, Figure 6 ). Clearly, the decision to buy information depends on the cost of changing prices because after buying information a firm can choose to update price. Why should a firm buy information if it is not going to change its price given a larger menu cost? After all, no firm wants to let information become obsolete. Indeed, the firm should buy information only if there is a good chance it is going to change its price. However, there is another force to be considered. Because price changes are more costly, firms should be more certain about the environment before they change their price. This increased caution induces firms to buy information more frequently. In the end, the second motive dominates and the region of "buy information" increases. A greater occurrence of endogenous purchases of information makes the price level more informative. On the other hand, greater menu costs exacerbate the information externality thus making price adjustment more sluggish and the price level less informative. In summary, the second effect dominates and the distribution of the price level is shifted towards the center. Predictably, a greater menu cost raises the size of the average absolute price change from 0.485 to 0.595.
One can draw several lessons from these comparative statics. First, the equilibrium distribution of the price level is highly sensitive to the frequency at which firms buy information. Specifically, the equilibrium distribution generally becomes concentrated in the regions close to the end points of the price range when firms buy information more frequently. Second, an increased concentration of the price distribution represented by spikes generally makes the price level more informative and, hence, reduces the persistence of inflation. Third, equilibrium effects play an important role in determining the optimal policy and optimal reset price. Also, because of the equilibrium effects, the responses are highly non-linear in parameter values.
Extensions
Large shocks
To study the effects of big changes in monetary policy, one could introduce more states of the money regime into the model. However, even the present two-state version of the model can provide intuition of what one can get with more money regimes. Suppose one can rank regimes from low to high. If monetary policy switches from one regime to another, adjacent regime, it may be difficult for agents to discern the change because the likelihood ratio of the signals is likely to be close to one. Hence, price adjustment is gradual. On the other hand, if the change in the money regime is greater (that is, regime switches to a more "distant" one), agents can learn more quickly about the change because the likelihood ratio is going to be significantly different from one. It follows that the real impact of a large nominal shock is likely to be small (less than proportional) because price adjustment in this case is faster than in the case with a "small" nominal shock.
4.2
High inflation Although my model does not have a regime consistent with high inflation, the intuition behind my main results suggests that the cost of disinflation in a high inflation economy should be smaller than the proportionally rescaled cost of disinflation in a low inflation economy. Indeed, the previous sub-section suggests that large changes are easier to discern for agents and, hence, the real cost of stopping high inflation can be small when compared with the cost of a small to moderate disinflation. In principle, the cost of reducing inflation from 100% to 10% may have smaller real effects than reducing inflation from 2% to 1%. Therefore, "shock therapy" may be a good policy prescription for significant disinflations.
There can be, however, another channel that diminishes the real effects of stopping high inflation.
Recall that information is a non-rival good and, hence, when demand for information is high, the cost of producing information can be spread over many customers and the price of information falls. As a result, information is cheaper and more abundant and precise. Indeed, Carroll (2003) and Veldkamp (2006b) report that the frequency of words associated with inflation in newspapers increases with the level of inflation. One can find inflation reports, exchange rate quotations, and macroeconomic forecasts in economies with high inflation more frequently than in economies with low inflation. In my model, less expensive additional signals z, or more precise free signals x result in lower inflation inertia. In the limit when information is perfect, price adjustment is instantaneous. Thus, the real effects of money shocks are likely to be small. In short, the endogenous acquisition of information can explain costly disinflation in low inflation environments (Gordon 1982) and essentially costless disinflation in hyperinflation economies (Sargent 1986 ).
4.3
Strategic complementarity If there is strategic complementarity, firms may have an incentive to conceal their information to convince other firms that demand is different from what it actually is. In other words, firms may intentionally distort signals they send to other firms (see, e.g., Andersen and Hviid 1994, Caplin and Leahy 1994) . Because communication between firms becomes "noisier", the degree of rigidity induced by the information externality increases and, hence, price adjustment could become more sluggish.
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Strategic complementarity affects the response of inflation in another way. Given strategic complementarity in demand, adjusting firms choose to under-react to any shock because otherwise they would lose their markets to competitors. But if adjusting firms change their prices by a little, the price level changes slightly. A small change in the price level can indicate a small probability of a regime change. Given the information content of the price level, firms will have a weaker incentive to change price in subsequent periods. Hence, the information externality and strategic complementarity can reinforce each other. This mechanism can be further amplified if firms coordinate on what information they choose to focus on (Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009 ). These mechanisms combined can make price adjustment even more sluggish.
5
Concluding remarks
This paper develops a model with state-dependent pricing and acquisition of information. The model generates endogenous rigidity in price setting and a sluggish, hump-shaped response of inflation to nominal shocks. This result sharply contrasts with previous findings for models with state-dependent pricing. The model also matches qualitatively many stylized facts about price setting and acquisition of information.
The paper emphasizes the key role of the information externality in generating the results.
Specifically, private information is not communicated to other firms because firms may find it suboptimal to change prices in the presence of fixed costs of adjustment. Furthermore, privately-borne costs create incentives for firms to postpone price adjustment until more information is revealed by the actions of other firms via the endogenous price level which aggregates private information about nominal demand by aggregating firm-level prices. If firms delay their price adjustment in anticipation of more information being revealed by the price level, the price level adjustment is delayed, further delaying the subsequent response of firms' prices and, consequently, the price level to nominal shocks. In summary, there are important equilibrium effects in how firms respond to shocks; that is, pricing policies at the firm level affect the behavior of aggregate variables and vice versa. The same logic applies to endogenous acquisition of information.
A number of simplifying assumptions are made to highlight the interplay between the information externality, menu costs, and price adjustment. These assumptions make the model abstract and not 33 If there is a non-anonymous firm with better information (informational leader), price adjustment will be completed faster since the price of the informational leader works like an additional signal provided that the leader does not use its price to profit from confusion of other firms. If the informational leader is anonymous (i.e., firms do not observe the price of the informational leader), then the implications for aggregate dynamics are similar to the case when the precision of signal x is increased.
appropriate for quantitative exercises. The way to approach this paper is the way economists think about, for example, Caplin and Spulber (1987) . That pathbreaking paper and much of the subsequent literature studying menu-cost economies show an important qualitative result that under certain circumstances state-dependent pricing can lead to neutrality of nominal shocks. Likewise, this paper presents qualitative results that hopefully could change the way we approach models with state-dependent pricing, i.e., with imperfect information and endogenous public signals state-dependent pricing can entail significant non-neutralities of nominal shocks. Future work should be directed toward incorporating the main ideas of the paper into a fully articulated, more realistic, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to assess the quantitative importance of these ideas. Spulber&Caplin (1987 ) Caplin&Leahy (1991 , 1997 Gertler&Leahy (2008) Golosov&Lucas (2007) Dotsey et al. (1999) Burstein (2006) Midrigan (2006) Calvo (1983) Taylor (1980) Fischer (1977) Ball&Mankiw (1994) Kiley (2000) Classical Imperfect, exogenous
Present model
Ball&Cecchetti (1988) Erceg&Levin (2003) Bonomo&Carvalho (2004) Caballero ( (2002) Reis ( Present model ---- Stiglitz (1976, 1980) Note: Cross correlation of variable x to variable y is computed as , . Intensive margin is the average price change. Extensive margin is the fraction of firms that change price. In column (2) autocorrelation is for inflation while in columns (3)-(6) cross correlations are for the absolute value of inflation (price change). |Inflation| means that correlations are reported for the absolute value of inflation. Note: Cross correlation of variable x to variable y is computed as , . Intensive margin is the average price change. Extensive margin is the fraction of firms that change price. The case of "no endogenous information" corresponds to the case where signal z it is not available to firms. The case of "no price level" corresponds to the case where the price level is not observed by firms. |Inflation| means that correlations are reported for the absolute value of inflation. conditional on nominal demand being high. The conditional distribution of given the low regime is symmetric to the presented distribution around 0.5. Panel D plots the probability of price adjustment given that price remained fixed for a given number of periods (duration of the price spell). Baseline parameterization in all panels. Note: This figure plots the impulse response of inflation when nominal demand changes from low to high and the economy starts from the lowdemand steady state. These impulse responses correspond to the event of the regime change at t = 138 in Figure 3 . The case of "no z and no P" corresponds to the scenario where the price level is not observable to firms and signal z it is not available to firms. Line "Idiosyncratic shocks" corresponds to the scenario where firms are randomly hit with firm-specific shocks to menu costs. See text for further details. 
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 line benchmark alternative and is independently distributed across time and firms.
Step 3: Pr | P P P P P | P P | P P | P P P | P P | P P | P P P , ,
where equality (A) follows from step 2; equality (B) definition of the conditional distribution for signal x; equality (C) follows from step 1 and the last equality uses the definitions ⁄ , ⁄ . Note that the evolution of the posterior is not recursive because it depends on the information vector I t . In other words, depends not only on and , , signals received in period t, but also on the history of signals received before t. However, given assumption in equation (12), the conditional distribution of the price level is instead of , and hence which is recursive in . ■
Since the price at t = 0 is equal to 0, only one case is considered : -keep the price fixed at : payoff = , -change the price to : payoff = 1 , The value functions are approximated on the grid with 100 equally spaced points. Parameterization of the model is discussed in Section 3.1.
Suppose that firms can observe only private signals. The response of inflation for this scenario is represented by the thick solid line in Appendix Figure 1 . The qualitative pattern of the response is simple: inflation increases sharply at the time of the shock and then gradually declines. This shape is determined by the fact that the change in the posterior probability of being in the high regime is concave in the prior and the strength of the received signal so that the change in beliefs is the greatest with the first signal. In other words, every additional signal brings less information than the preceding signal and therefore the response is strongest to the most informative piece of news, which arrives in the first period.
Now consider an alternative scenario where firms can observe the price level in previous periods. Since firms are fully rational (i.e., fit the right model to interpret public signals) and there is a continuum of firms, the price level is fully revealing. Thus, in period t = 2, firms know the state of nominal demand with certainty. In this case, firms have two options in period t = 1: A) change the price now; B) wait another period, observe the price level at t = 1, infer the state of nominal demand and then change the price. Since every firm knows the state of nominal demand in period t = 2, there is no price adjustment in t = 3. The response of inflation is represented by the thick broken line in Appendix Figure 1 . Note that in this scenario the peak response of inflation is delayed. Most firms choose to postpone price adjustment until full information is revealed precisely for the reasons described above, i.e., the possibility to observe actions of other firms creates incentives to engage in the "wait-and-see" game and to delay price adjustment to free ride on other firms. Note that a fraction of firms chooses to change their prices in the first period because they receive strong private signals (recall that signals are drawn from normal distribution so that signals have unbounded support).
To show the sensitivity of the inflation response to information available in t = 2 or t = 3, it is convenient to work with private signals whose precision increases with time, that is, the standard deviation of the noise in the signals at t = 2 or t = 3 is a fraction of the standard deviation of the noise in the signal at t = 1. Denote the standard deviation of the noise in periods 1, 2 and 3 with , , and assume that Δ , Δ Figure 1 . This comparative statics exercise shows that transition from Δ 1 to Δ 0 is monotonic for fractions of firms adjusting their prices in periods t = 1 and t = 2 but the change is nonlinear.
